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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THIRTEENTH AND WASHINGTON 
STREETS CORPORATION, a California 
eorpora tion, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
CLARENCE C. NESLEN, ELLIOTT \V. 
EV~-\~S, H. D. LOWRY, and MARVIN J. 
BERTOCH. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 7875 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff and Appellant Thirteenth 
and Washington ;Streets Corporation, a California Cor-
poration, and respectfully petitions this Court for a 
rehearing in accordance with Rule 76, Utah R.ules of 
Civil Procedure, alleging that this court has erred in 
the following respects: 
1. The Findings of Fact of the trial court do not 
constitute either expressly or by implication ultimate 
facts to justify the legal conclusiDn of constructive evic-
tion and this court erred in holding that such a legal 
conclusion was here justified. 
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2. The trial court did make express findings of 
ultimate fact as to heat, light, janitor and elevator 
service, which do not meet the standards set by this court 
in its opinion in this case to justify its legal conclusion 
of constructive eviction and this court erred in so holding. 
3. Even if one assumes the absence of an express 
finding of ultimate fact by the trial court in this case, 
such ultimate fact cannot be presumed when it does not 
"necessarily follow," and such ultimate fact does not 
necessarily follow in the facts in this case and this 
court erred in so holding. 
4. The remaining defects other than heat, light, 
janitor and elevator service found by the trial court 
do not expressly meet the standard of substantial depri-
vation required by this court in its opinion in this caS'e 
and this ultimate fact cannot be presumed and this court 
erred in so doing. 
5. Barker vs. Utah Oil Refinirng Compawy, 111 Utah 
308, 178 Pac. 2d 386 is not authority for the absence of 
a volitional element in the definition of constructive 
eviction in that the statement therein was mere dicta 
unsupported by the very authorities cited in the quota-
tion used, and is against the weight of authority in the 
United States. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFF'AT 
& MABEY 
PETER W. BILLINGS 
ALBERT J. COLTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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BRIE~, ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEl\lENT OF F'ACTS 
This ease involves an action for rent to which De-
fendants answered with the defense of constructive evic-
tion. Plaintiff appealed fron1 a judgment in favor of De-
fendants, and this court affirmed the trial court . 
.. A.ppellant's original brief presents detailed argu-
Inents on numerous questions which it is respectfully 
submitted are not discussed by this court in its opinion. 
This is especially true with regard to the question of the 
necessary volitional element to constitute a constructive 
eviction. .£.~ppellant, in its original brief, conceded that 
one must be held to intend the natural consequences of 
his actions, but argued this was not applicable to this 
case. The undisputed fact that the court's quotation in 
the Utah Oil Case (Ba.rker v. Utah Oil Refining Comparny, 
111 Utah 308, 178 Pac. 2d 386) was mere dicta, consti-
tuting a quotation from Black's Law Dictionary which 
\vas unsupported by the various authorities therein, was 
not discussed. 
However, this Petition is not filed to rehash already 
argued questions. It is confined to this court's discus-
sion of the lo,ver court's findings of fact. If error exists 
here it is, of course, unnecessary to proceed further. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
DO NOT CONSTITUTE, EITHER EXPRESSLY OR BY IM-
PLICATION, ULTIMATE FACTS TO JUSTIFY THE LEGAL 
CONCLUSION OF CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION. 
A. The Trial Court did make express findings of 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ultimate fact as to heat, light, janitor and ele.vator serv-
ice which d.o not meet the standard set by this court to 
justify its legal conclusion of constructive eviction. 
B. Assum.itng the absence of an express finding of 
ultimate fact, this cwnnot be presunted when it does not 
"necessa.rily follow," and this court erred in so doing. 
C. The remaining defects found do not expressly 
meet the stan.da.rd of substantial depriva.tion required 
by this court, and this ultimate fact cannot be presumed. 
D. Conclusion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
DO NOT CONSTITUTE, EITHER EXPRESSLY OR BY IM-
PLICATION, ULTIMATE FACTS TO JUSTIFY THE LEGAL 
CONCLUSION OF CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION. 
A. The Trial Court did make express findings of 
ultimate fact as to heat, light, ja;nitor atnd elevator serv-
ice which do not m.eet the standard set by this court to 
justify its legal conclusion of constructive eviction. 
The essential question in this law suit is whether the 
acts of the landlord resulted in that quantum of depriva-
tion of beneficial enjoyment to the tenants so as to lead, 
as a legal conclusion, to a finding that they had been con-
structively evicted. 
This court has held that in the light of the specific 
lease provisions here (viz., that Plaintiff shall be "sole 
judge" of the amount of heat, light, janitor and elevator 
service to be furnished) that these defects must be 
flagrant and unreasonable in order to find as a conclusion 
of law that Defendants were constructively evicted. 
Failure of heat, light, janitor and elevator service are 
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clearly the preponderant objections raised by Defend-
ants. 
HFlagrant and unreasonable" defects are thus the 
ultimate facts fron1 'vhich the trial court could legally 
conclude that Defendants were entitled to relief. We have 
now set our standard in this case, which the above-named 
defects must meet, for Defendants to prevail. Do they 
1neet this1 
It is undisputed that the trial court made no such 
ultin1ate findings. However, this court felt that the 
finding of such ultimate fact would not be necessary 
\vhere such ultimate fact "must necessarily follow" from 
the probative facts found by the trial court. 
Appellants have no quarrel with this rule in the ab-
stract, but they earnestly contend that this court erred 
in applying it to this case. 
Evidentiary of probative facts and ultimate facts 
have been distinguished as follows: 
". . . generally speaking, the distinction is 
that the findings of evidentiary facts relate to evi-
dence of the existence of some other fact, and 
those of ultimate fact to the final resulting effect 
reached by logical reasoning from the evidentiary 
facts." 
64 Corpus Juris, 1276; Trial, Sec. 1154. 
It is only necessary, and indeed is preferred, that 
the trial court restrict its findings of fact to ultimate 
facts. 
3 Bancroft's Code Pleading, Practice and 
Remedies, 10 Year S.upplement, page 
2214. 
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It is the exceptional case where a court, in its findings of 
fact, adopted as drafted by Defendants, would make ex-
press findings as to the probative facts but leave the 
highly critical ultimate fact to be presumed from these, 
when the correlation between the probative facts and 
the ultimate fact of flagrant and unreasonable defect is 
the very issue before the court. 
Appellant con tends that the trial court did in fact 
make findings of ultimate fact in this case. These ulti-
mate facts, however, were not of the quantum of defect 
set by this court and urged by Appellant as necessary to 
lead to a legal conclusion of constructive eviction; there-
fore, the trial court erred and should, from these findings 
of ultimate fact; have entered judgment for Plaintiff. 
A review of the findings as to express defects makes 
Appellant's contention clearer. 
Finding VII states that heating problems occurred 
frequently and during the cold n1onths, resulting in the 
"\Vearing of heavy winter overclothing (probative facts). 
The finding recites that the heat was thus "inadequate" 
(ultimate fact). 
F'inding VIII recites that the janitor service of the 
premises was "inadequate" (ultimate fact). 
F'inding IX recites that restrooms were not clean, 
properly ventilated or adequately supplied with soap, 
towels or toilet paper (probative facts), and thus were 
"inadequate" (ultimate fact). 
Finding X recites that janitor service of the hall, 
stairways and lobby was "inadequate" (ultimate fact). 
Finding XI recites that a barber shop and shoe shine 
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~tand "~ere per1nitted to be established (probative facts), 
that these were offensive in sight (ultilnate fact), detri-
Inental to Defendants' practice ( ultilnate fact) and dis-
agreeable (ultimate fact). 
~.,inding XII recites that Plaintiff failed to furnish 
elevator service after 8:00 P.M. (probative fact), which 
greatly inconvenienced Defendants (ultimate fact), and 
that their clients were frequently obliged to come to De-
fendants' offices up unlighted latrine-like stairs (pro-
bative fact) to the detriment of Defendants' professional 
relationships ( ulti1n·ate fact). 
Finding XIII recites that Plaintiff closed the build-
ing on Sundays and holidays and after 8 :00 P.M. (pro-
bative fact), to the inconvenience of Defendants (ultimate 
fact), and to the detriment of their professional relation. 
ship (ultimate fact). 
Findings as to "inadequacy", "detrimental relation-
ships", and "inconvenience" are only found as a result 
of certain more basic probative or evidentiary facts, the 
body of which leads to this factual conclusion. Such facts 
cannot be probative or evidentiary. They must thus either 
be ultimate or, as this court seemed to construe them, 
they must be of some intermediate, previously unclassi-
fied nature between the two, from which this court held, 
one must "necessarily" presume the ultimate fact. of 
flagrant and unreasonable defects. 
To find probative facts and "intermediate" facts 
and legal conclusions, but to omit the one essential fac-
tual finding and to leave this to be implied is a most un-
orthodox approach for any trial court. One· cannot so 
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radically interpret a court's findings merely on the basis 
of the standard rule that they should interpret inferences 
most favorably to R.espondents. 
The only natural interpretation of these findings is 
that the trial court, and Defendants' counsel, followed 
orthodox procedure; that they drafted and found certain 
probative or evidentiary facts (a practice oJ'tional with 
trial courts) which led the court to their ultimate facts 
(viz., inadequacy, detrimental relationships and incon-
venience). The sole question then before this court is-
are these facts a finding of flagrant and unreasonable 
deficiency~ This is question of semantics. It is clear 
that "inadequacy", "inconvenience" or "detrimental rela-
tionships" alone or together cannot equal flagrant un-
reasonableness. 
Appellant does not so argue to escape judgment on a 
technicality. It so argues because it believes that this 
problem clearly illustrates the trial court's error. Appel-
lant has admitted that this was not the best of office 
buildings. Appellant will even admit arguendo the court's 
findings that the defects were "inadequate", resulting 
in "inconvenience" and "detrimental cliental relation-
ships". But the law says, and this court concurs, that 
this is not enough. The trial court erred in holding that 
it was. 
B. Assuming the absence of an express finding of 
ultim.ate fact, this COJYI!not be presumed when it does not 
"necessarily follow," and this court erred in so doing. 
Even if one assumed that the trial court's findings as 
to "inadequacy", etc. were not ultimate facts but of some 
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inter1nediate nature, the fact then 1nust be faced that 
one n1ust, if one ean, presume what the ultimate facts are. 
One must here discover a finding of flagrant unreason-
ableness hy presu1nption. 
This court attempts this in several ways which, it is 
respectfully urged, are subject to error. 
First, this court stated 
•'From the fact that the court found the issue 
in favor of Defendants and accepted their evi-
dence, it appears that the testimony with respect 
to the unsatisfactory restroom facilities, a lack of 
enough heat, and the unlighted stairway was such 
that the deficiencies in the services involved could 
only have been flagrant and unreasonable." 
In this way, the findings are allowed to lift themselves 
by their own boot straps. The question to be decided is 
whether the trial court erred in concluding from its ulti-
rnate fact that constructive eviction resulted. If the 
ultimate fact showed flagrant unreasonableness, there 
was no error. If it did not, there was error. One cannot, 
as this court did, thus say that as the trial court found 
that a constructive eviction occurred, that the ultimate 
fact must have ;;upported it. This begging the very ques-
tion in hand. As Bancroft has said, 
"Conclusions of law cannot take the place of 
ultimate facts." 
3 Brancroft Code Pleading, Practice and 
Remedies, 10 Year Supplement, page 
2214, Sec. 1686. 
Secondly, this court relies on the well established 
rule that: 
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"Where findings as to probative facts are 
made from which must necessarily follow the ex-
istence of a required ultimate fact, the failure to 
expressly formulate a finding as to the ultiniate 
fact is not prejudicial error." 
Yet the very question before us is whether the probative 
facts· (and the "intermediate" facts) "must necessarily 
follow". In some cases, this is an easy matter. Thus, in 
one of the cases cited by this court in support of this 
rule (Jessen v. Peterson, Nelson&!; Co., 18 Cal Ap. 345, 
123 Pac. 219), it was a mere mathematical calculation 
from probative facts. The trial court had found that 
Plaintiff had expended One Hundred Twenty-Two and 
50/100 Dollars ($122.50) in medical bills. The conclusion 
of law gave judgment for One Thousand Dollars ($1,-
000.00). The ultimate fact as to the recovery for personal 
injury was determined, although not expressly found, by 
sub~racting One Hundred Twenty-Two and 50/100 Dol-
lars ($122.50) from One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) .. 
Th.e ultimate fact in this case cannot be found by 
subtraction or by any other inference. The record shows 
no substantial dispute as to the probative facts. They 
probably could have been reached by stipulation. But 
the crux of this law suit is the characterization of the 
ultimate fact-it is of crucial importance. And there is 
clearly nothing w~ich "necessarily" (Fooch v. Bates, 18 
Ida. 374, 110 Pac. 265) or "conclusively" (Jessen v. Peter-
son, et al, supra) makes the ultimate fact of flagrant un-
reasonableness result from either "intermediate" facts 
of "inadequacy", etc. or of probative facts as to shoe 
10 
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shine stands, elevator service, etc. This is the very ques-
tion '"'hich determines this law suit. 
If it did "necessarily follow" from these various 
facts that the ultimate fact would be presumed, then this 
court 'vould in effect be stating that in the case of a mis-
placed shoe shine stand, or faulty elevator service or the 
like, that these as a matter of law constitute a construc-
tive eviction. It is felt that this is not what this court 
intended-rather than such an inflexible rule, its inten-
tion was to leave the determination of such ultimate facts 
to the discretion of the trial court which had heard and 
\Veighed the evidence at first hand. 
When the omitted ultimate fact is equivocal or not 
entirely certain from the facts found, the trial court has 
a duty to resolve such doubt by a direct finding of the 
essential ultimate fact. This court cannot fulfill that 
duty for it. 
This argument was admirably stated by an Indiana 
Court. 
'" ... As applied to the instant case, the 
rule may be stated to be that if the finding of 
fact is of such a character as to involve necessarily 
the existence of the essential ultimate fact (not 
expressly found), then the failure to find the 
omitted ultimate fact may be immaterial. But 
when the existence of the omitted ultimate fact 
(not found) may reasonably be doubted from the 
facts found, or is equivocal and not entirely cer-
tain, then the trial court must resolve such doubt 
or equivocation or uncertainness by a direct find-
ing of the essential ultimate fact. When this rule 
of law is considered with the ru1e that on appeal 
all facts not embraced in the special finding. of 
11 
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facts will be regarded as not true by the party 
having the burden of that issue and will be equi-
valent to finding against the party having such 
burden, then it becomes apparent that in the in-
stant case the appellee must fail ... " 
Dickason v. Dickason, 18 NE 2d 479 at 483. 
As a third approach to the problem this court held 
that the cumulative effect of the probative facts would 
sustain a presumption of a finding of the necessary ulti-
mate fact although each of the probative facts in itself 
might not be enough. Thus, this court said, 
"It is true as plaintiff alleges that the trial 
court made no specific finding that, in the terms 
just discussed, the failures were flagrant, wanton 
or wholly unreasonable; the fact remains that he 
found they were inadequate, and that, coupled 
with the other deficiencies complained of, they 
constituted a constructive eviction ... It is not 
our problem to evaluate separately the conditions 
complained of. It may well be that various of 
them taken alone would not be of sufficient im-
portance to create a substantial impairment of 
the use and enjoyment of the premises. However, 
it is a cun1ulative effect of them ·an which must 
be considered in determining the soundness of the 
judgment." 
This approach, it is submitted, is merely an adjunct 
to the "necessarily follow" rule discussed above. It 
states that although one such probative fact may not 
lead necessarily or even possibly to the required ultimate 
fact, several taken together might. With this, Appellant 
cannot quarrel; but this does not mean tha.t such cumu-
lative facts must lead to the required ultimate fact. 
12 
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,\ ... hether they do or do not is, again, the very problem 
"chich it is up to the trial court to decide. 
C. The re1na,in.ing defects found do not expressly 
meet the standard of su.bstantial deprivation required 
by this cowrt, and thi.s ultin~ate fact carn,not be presumed. 
Assuming that the "sole judge" provisions of the 
lease only raise the quantum required for the ultimate 
·· fact to flagrant unreasonableness in the case of heat, 
light, janitor and elevator service, then the other ob-
jections are held to an admittedly lower standard. By 
this Court's opinion, this standard requires "substantial" 
deprivation. 
Examining the other objections we see that the court 
found that they were "offensive", "detrimental to defend-
ants' practice" and "disagreeable" (Findings XI and 
XIII), and not first class (Finding VI). Do these find-
ings by themselves meet the legal quantum necessary~ 
They must stand alone, because according to Appellant's 
contention, the findings as to heat, light, janitor and ele-
vator service do not meet the necessary standard to 
justify the court's legal conclusion. 
Again, it is clear semantically that "offensive" 
' 
"detrimental" and "disagreeable" are not automatically 
equated with substantial deprivation of enjoyment. To 
uphold the lower court, this court must once again class-
ify the court's findings as "intermediate" facts and pre-
sume the ultimate fact. This approach is only valid if 
such ultimate fact would "necessarily" follow. The de-
.. batability of this is clearly shown by the fact that the 
court chose to include other facts as to heat, light, jani-
13 
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tor and elevator service to cumulatively buttress its find-
ing; and further, in the case of the locked door, by the 
lack of emphasis placed on this by Defendants them-
selves, the objection being absent from the objections 
listed in Defendants' notice of vacating and in their 
interrogatory answers. (In any event, this latter objec-
tion most likely was 1nerely a question of contractual in-
terpretation.) 
D. Conclusion. 
Flor the same reasons outlined earlier, it makes no 
difference whether all of the court's findings of fact must 
meet the higher quantum of deprivation or only "sub-
stantial" deprivation. The trial court has not expressly 
met either test, and this question being the crucial one 
in this case and not necessarily following from the facts 
so found, it is subn1itted that this court erred in uphold-
ing the trial court's conclusion of law based on such find-
ings of fact. 
This is the first time this court has had an oppor-
tunity to review the substantive problem of constructive 
eviction. It is clear that this doctrine was the result of a 
need for a more equitable technique for the adjustment 
of landlord and tenant relationships. At this date, our 
economic picture is such that it is a lessor's market, and 
he has been fairly successful in dictating his terms. New 
construction has created more space and the day may 
soon be near when it will be the tenant who will have 
superior economic bargaining power. This time has al- . 
ready arrived in many cities. In any event, Utah land-
lords and tenants must look to this case alone for guid-
14 
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ance. At this juncture they find that a lease as rigidly 
'vorded as one Inight imagine, made and entered into with 
tenants "'"ho were trained by their very profession in the 
mysteries of the law of contracts, may be broken merely 
upon the finding of the trial court that the landlord's 
services had been inadequate and resulted in inconven-
ience and detriment to their business. Sympathy might 
dictate such relief in this case, but it will only make 
hard la'v which Appellant is confident this court will 
have to distinguish upon another turn of the economic 
wheel. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOF'FAT 
& MABEY, 
PETER W. BILLINGS 
ALBERT J. COLTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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